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How “Participatory Governance” 
Strengthens Authoritarian Regimes:  
Evidence from Electoral Authoritarian 
Oaxaca, Mexico 
Allyson Lucinda Benton 
Abstract: Research on the impact of participatory institutions in Latin 
America has not yet examined how they work in authoritarian settings. Na-
tional autocrats in Mexico implemented participatory reforms during that 
country’s national electoral authoritarian regime. Building on research on 
political decentralization in authoritarian regimes, I argue that participatory 
institutions can be used to channel citizen demands and to incorporate citi-
zens into authoritarian systems, thereby strengthening authoritarian rule. 
However, following research on democratic participatory governance, I also 
argue that participatory institutions will work better in this regard when 
designed from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Statistical 
analysis of patterns of municipal-level electoral authoritarian support in 
Mexico shows that bottom-up-designed participatory institutions imple-
mented during electoral authoritarian rule strengthened local political control 
to a greater extent than top-down-designed political systems. The study 
supports research revealing the anti-democratic effects of participatory insti-
tutions in democratic Latin American nations. 
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Introduction 
The third wave of democratization in Latin America in the 1980s left 
behind a series of democratically elected governments whose legitimacy 
was widely questioned in the 1990s. In response, political elites promot-
ed decentralizing reforms to bring policy-making closer to citizens 
through the transfer of policy authority, fiscal resources, and political 
rights to lower levels of government (O’Neill 2005). To this end, many 
decentralizing reforms included institutional innovations to promote 
“participatory governance” (Eaton 2004b; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; 
McNulty 2011; Van Cott 2008; Wampler 2008). Participatory governance 
constitutes institutional mechanisms that allow citizens – especially mar-
ginalized ones – to participate in the formation, selection, design, imple-
mentation, and oversight of local governments and policy programs. 
When used to incorporate marginalized groups, participatory institutions 
are sometimes coupled with the recognition of indigenous rights and 
customary laws (Van Cott 2008). Participatory institutions based on local 
customs are often referred to as “multicultural institutions.” 
Research1 on participatory institutions in Latin America has exam-
ined whether and how these measures improve the quality of democratic 
governance (for example, see Eaton 2004b; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; 
McNulty 2011; Van Cott 2008; Wampler 2008). Scholars have shown 
that when participatory institutions are designed from the top down, 
improvements in citizen participation in local politics and policy-making 
tend to be limited (Eaton 2004a, b; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Van Cott 
2008; Wampler 2008). While participatory institutions certainly raise the 
capacity for citizens to participate in local politics and policy-making, the 
rigidity inherent in a shared set of institutions that are implemented uni-
versally from the top down limits their positive effect. In contrast, when 
localities are allowed to design participatory institutions from the bottom 
up, improvements in citizen participation in local politics and policy-
making tend to be greater (Eaton 2004a, b; McNulty 2011; Van Cott 
2008; Wampler 2008). Bottom-up-designed participatory institutions 
enable public officials to tailor the institutions to their communities’ 
social, political and economic realities, enhancing the capacity for citizens 
to participate in local policy-making and thus the positive impact of 
these institutions on democratic governance. 
                                                 
1  Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Francisco Cantú and Ernesto Calvo for 
suggesting and providing the R code for the ecological regression analysis. I 
thank Scott Desposato and Amy Liu for comments on earlier versions of this 
study. All errors are my own. 
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Participatory governance is usually depicted as a means of address-
ing the limitations of representative democracy (Barber 1984; Wampler 
2008), where higher-level elected officials, appointed bureaucrats, policy 
experts, and political elites make policy decisions. It may therefore come 
as a surprise to find that Mexico’s long-surviving electoral authoritarian 
regime also undertook participatory reforms. Mexico’s national electoral 
authoritarian rulers began to decentralize policy-making in the 1980s and 
implemented electoral reforms to allow opposition parties greater capaci-
ty to compete for and win municipal, state, and national offices along the 
way (Grindle 2000, 2007; Rodríguez 1997; Selee 2006, 2011). What is less 
well known is that Mexico’s authoritarian rulers included constitutional 
reforms as a part of their politically decentralizing measures to allow the 
adoption of participatory institutions as well. 
Specifically, national constitutional reforms in 1983 allowed munici-
palities to create bottom-up-designed municipal development planning 
councils, although few were actually set up (Fox 2007; Selee 2006). Con-
stitutional reforms in 1992 recognized the nation’s multicultural heritage, 
opening the door for state measures to recognize local participatory 
practices operating informally in many peasant and indigenous commu-
nities (Anaya Muñoz 2005; Fox 2007; López Bárcenas 2010; Sierra 1995). 
Sixteen out of Mexico’s 31 states undertook constitutional reforms in the 
early to mid-1990s to recognize their multicultural heritages, with one 
(Guerrero) doing so as early as 1987 (López Bárcenas 2010).2 However, 
most of these states did not match constitutional reforms with secondary 
legislation, instead only allowing municipal and sub-municipal (hamlet) 
authorities to use participatory institutions informally (Anaya Muñoz 
2005, 2006; de León Pasquel 2001; Fox 1996, 2007; López Bárcenas 
2010).  
In contrast, authorities in the indigenous southern states of Chiapas 
and Oaxaca, as well as in the non-indigenous central states of Tlaxcala, 
Morelos, and Puebla, formally codified local participatory institutions 
into law. Given research on the differential effects of bottom-up- and 
top-down-designed participatory institutions in Latin America’s demo-
cratic systems, we might wonder whether this same distinction was pre-
sent in Mexico’s electoral authoritarian states and whether it produced 
differential political effects for electoral authoritarian control. By joining 
research on the impact of participatory governance in democratic sys-
tems with insights about political decentralization in national authoritari-
                                                 
2  Another three states adopted constitutional reforms after the nation’s demo-
cratic transition in 2000 (López Bárcenas 2010). 
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an regimes, I argue that the degree to which participatory institutions 
benefit electoral authoritarian regimes depends on whether these institu-
tions are designed from the bottom up or from the top down. Specifical-
ly, participatory institutions will deliver greater benefits to authoritarian 
rulers when they are individually tailored to local economic, social, and 
political conditions from the bottom up than when they are universally 
designed and implemented from the top down. 
I test this argument using data from the state of Oaxaca. Unlike in 
Chiapas, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala, which only authorized participa-
tory institutions at the sub-municipal hamlet or lower community level, 
autocrats in the state of Oaxaca granted participatory rights directly to 
many – but not all – of its municipal authorities, making it easier to 
measure and compare the effect of these bottom-up-designed institu-
tions to top-down-designed ones on authoritarian rule. In September 
1995, authorities in the state of Oaxaca granted 412 out of their total 570 
municipalities the right to create bottom-up-designed participatory insti-
tutions for selecting municipal governments and making policy decisions, 
referring to these municipalities as “Usos y Costumbres” or “Uses and 
Customs” (UyC) systems. The state’s remaining 158 municipalities were 
granted a common set of rules for selecting municipal governments that 
were universally designed from the top down; these are referred to as 
“Partidos Políticos” or “Political Parties” (PP) systems. Conveniently for 
the purposes of this study, UyC municipal leaders could tailor these 
institutions to local conditions, but PP municipal leaders could not. Alt-
hough PP municipalities enjoyed newly decentralized political rights – 
making it possible for parties to compete for and win municipal offices 
in elections determined locally by citizens rather than centrally by auto-
crats – these institutional arrangements were determined from the top 
down and could not be tailored to local political dynamics.  
Statistical analysis of the effect of Oaxaca’s bottom-up-designed 
UyC institutions compared to its top-down-designed PP ones shows that 
UyC systems gave municipal leaders greater political control in their 
localities. In undertaking this study, I hope to shed light on how partici-
patory institutions can be used by both authoritarian and democratic 
incumbents to strengthen their hold on power. Studies of participatory 
institutions in Venezuela and multicultural institutions in Bolivia show 
that they have been used by national incumbents to increase local policy 
and political participation among their supporters, something that has 
facilitated the rise of increasingly autocratic local and national rule (for 
example, see Hawkins 2010; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Schilling-Vaca-
flor 2011; Smilde and Hellinger 2011; Tockman and Cameron 2014; Van 
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Cott 2008). In-depth study of Oaxaca’s bottom-up-designed participa-
tory institutions in this study supports these findings by showing how 
electoral authoritarian leaders can use participatory institutions for the 
purpose of managing local political participation on behalf of authoritar-
ian regimes as well.  
Political Decentralization and Participatory 
Governance in Authoritarian Regimes 
Participatory institutions are designed to deepen political decentralization 
that is often undertaken to improve democratic governance in repre-
sentative democratic systems (Barber 1984). Political decentralization 
refers to institutional arrangements that allow the election of representa-
tives to lower levels of government authorized to determine and respond 
to local policy needs. However, most decentralized systems rely on rep-
resentative institutions whereby citizens elect officials who then deter-
mine, implement, and oversee local policy programs. Participatory gov-
ernance, in contrast, refers to a variety of additional institutional mecha-
nisms that enable citizens to express their political and policy preferences 
– such as through public town hall meetings – during the selection of 
local public officials and during the selection, design, implementation, 
and oversight of local policy programs (Barber 1984).  
Although scholars of Latin American politics usually envision polit-
ical decentralization and especially participatory institutions as a means 
of improving the quality of representative democratic governance (see, 
for example, McNulty 2011; O’Neill 2005; Wampler 2007), other schol-
ars of politics in non-Latin-American nations suggest that their benefits 
need not be limited to democratic systems. National authoritarian rulers 
often undertake political decentralization and implement participatory 
institutions to strengthen their hold on power. For example, scholars 
examining authoritarian regimes beyond Latin America have noted that 
political and policy decentralization can improve authoritarian govern-
ance in much the same way as it does in nationally democratic systems 
(e.g., Jin, Qian, and Weingast 2005; Landry 2008; Montinola, Qian, and 
Weingast 1996; Qian and Weingast 1996; Uchimura and Jütting 2007; 
Zhuravskaya 2000). The decentralization of local bureaucratic appoint-
ments and the use of local elections to select local regime officials im-
proves national authoritarian feedback on and oversight over local re-
gime officials (Gilley 2008; Hu 2005; Jiang 2007; Kelliher 1997; Kennedy 
2009; Landry 2008; Landry, Davis, and Wang 2010; Dong 2010; Manion 
2009, 2014; O’Brian and Li 2000; O’Brien and Han 2009; Oi and Rozelle 
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2000; Shi 1999; Truex 2014; Wang 1997). Scholars of Mexico – the em-
pirical point of focus in this study – have noted something similar about 
the expected benefits of political decentralization during its electoral 
authoritarian regime (e.g., Cornelius 1999; Grindle 2000; Hernández 
Rodríguez 2008; Selee 2011).  
Just as in nationally democratic systems, national authoritarian polit-
ical decentralization often includes the adoption of institutions for par-
ticipatory governance. Authoritarian participatory governance is similar 
to its democratic counterpart in that it seeks to create mechanisms for 
citizens to participate in the formation, selection, design, implementa-
tion, and oversight of local policy programs. However, proponents of 
democratic participatory governance seek to maximize participation in 
policy processes in order to produce maximal policy contestation and 
thus policy choices that better reflect citizens’ needs and demands 
(Wampler 2007). Proponents of authoritarian participatory governance, 
in contrast, seek to maximize local governmental transparency and over-
sight and local administrative capacity and policy efficiency (Collins and 
Chan 2009; He 2011; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; O’Brian and Li 2006; 
Truex 2014). Therefore, authoritarian participatory institutions are de-
signed to generate sufficient citizen participation for providing infor-
mation on local policy preferences and feedback on local governmental 
policy performance, so that autocrats can improve policy efficiency and 
raise citizens’ satisfaction with their rule, thereby strengthening authori-
tarian regimes (Collins and Chan 2009; He 2011; Jayasuriya and Rodan 
2007; O’Brian and Li 2006; Truex 2014). By creating vehicles for citizen 
participation, autocrats hope to incorporate citizens into local policy 
administration as well, thereby also co-opting them into authoritarian 
projects and strengthening authoritarian regimes (Collins and Chan 2009; 
He 2011; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; O’Brian and Li 2006; Truex 2014).  
However, studies of national authoritarian decentralization and par-
ticipatory institutions have found that these measures sometimes stimu-
late political liberalization. Because political decentralization and partici-
patory governance raise citizen participation in local policy debates, they 
can create opportunities for citizens to express divergent views from 
those of regime officials, triggering criticism of authoritarian rule and 
weakening national regimes (Grindle 2007; He 2011; Ko and Zhi 2013; 
Oi and Rozelle 2000; Pei 1995; Shi 1999; Uchimura and Jütting 2007; 
Zhuravskaya 2000). Rising citizen capacity to demonstrate regime oppo-
sition can empower citizens over local regime officials, subverting au-
thoritarian systems and raising the chance of democratic transition (He 
2011; Pei 1995; Shi 1999). Some scholars of Mexico’s national electoral 
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authoritarian regime have noted that its decentralizing reforms some-
times worked to facilitate the rise of opposition groups, contributing to 
the nation’s democratic transition (Grindle 2000, 2007; Ochoa-Reza 
2004; Rodríguez 1998; Selee 2011).  
Conflicting findings about the benefits of political decentralization 
and participatory democracy for national authoritarian regimes have led 
scholars to examine the underlying political, social, and economic con-
texts in which these reforms occur (see, for example, research by 
Blanchard and Shleifer 2001; Grindle 2007; Ko and Zhi 2013; O’Brian 
and Li 2000; Oi and Rozelle 2000; Selee 2011; Uchimura and Jütting 
2007; Zhuravskaya 2000). However, two factors remain understudied. 
First, unlike scholars of national democratic systems (e.g., Eaton 2004a, 
b; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Van Cott 2008; Wampler 2008), scholars of 
national authoritarian regimes have not yet examined whether the bot-
tom-up or top-down design of decentralizing political or participatory 
institutions might affect the strength of their benefits to these regimes. 
Second, unlike scholars of national democratic systems (e.g., Van Cott 
2008; Wampler 2007, 2008), scholars of national authoritarian regimes 
have only just begun to examine whether the placement of decentralized 
participatory institutions in pro-regime or anti-regime hands might mat-
ter for the direction of their impact on authoritarian regime support (e.g., 
Grindle 2000, 2007; Selee 2011). It may be the case that the design of 
decentralized political and participatory institutions and their placement 
in pro-regime or anti-regime hands work together to explain the diver-
gent findings about the impact of political decentralization on national 
authoritarian rule noted above. 
I argue that the design of authoritarian participatory institutions in-
teracts with their political placement to determine the strength and direc-
tion of their impact on national authoritarian rule. When participatory 
institutions are designed from the bottom up and placed in pro-regime 
hands, local pro-regime officials can tailor these institutions to the pecu-
liarities of local dynamics and use them to channel citizen participation, 
demands, and activities to maximize citizen integration into – or, at least, 
compliance with – the regime, thereby generating the greatest gains for 
authoritarian rule. Even though top-down-designed participatory institu-
tions in pro-regime hands can help local leaders deliver support to au-
thoritarian rulers, they will be less successful in this regard as local offi-
cials are unable to tailor them to local dynamics. Table 1 summarizes the 
relative expected effects of bottom-up- and top-down-designed partici-
patory institutions in pro-regime hands on authoritarian regime support. 
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Table 1. Relative Regime Support under Different Participatory Institution-
al Designs 
  Institutional Design 
  Bottom-Up 
Design vs. 
Top-Down 
Design 
Political 
Control 
Pro-Regime Hands > 
Anti-Regime Hands < 
 
In contrast, when participatory institutions are designed from the bottom 
up and placed in anti-regime hands, anti-regime officials can tailor these 
institutions to the peculiarities of local dynamics in ways to maximize 
opposition to authoritarian rule. Local anti-regime officials should use 
bottom-up-designed participatory institutions for the same purposes as 
pro-regime ones; that is: to channel citizen participation, demands, and 
activities to maximize citizen integration into – or, at least, compliance 
with – opposition rule, thereby generating the greatest gains for opposi-
tion control. Even though participatory institutions designed from the 
top down in anti-regime hands will also undermine support for the au-
thoritarian regime, the effect of these institutions will not be as strong 
due to the generic nature of the institutions that anti-regime leaders must 
use. Table 1 summarizes the relative expected effects that bottom-up- 
and top-down-designed participatory institutions in anti-regime hands 
will have on authoritarian regime losses. 
Political Decentralization and Participatory 
Governance in Electoral Authoritarian Oaxaca, 
Mexico 
I examine the impact that bottom-up- and top-down-designed participa-
tory institutions in pro- and anti-regime hands have on authoritarian rule 
using data from the state of Oaxaca, Mexico. Mexico is known for its 
longtime national electoral authoritarian regime run by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), which engineered overwhelming support in 
federal, state, and municipal elections until 2000.3 To maintain their hold 
on power, PRI autocrats used non-autonomous national- and state-level 
electoral institutes to manipulate electoral processes in their favor. How-
ever, rising political discontent led national autocrats to undertake top-
down-designed political decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s, in order 
                                                 
3  Some date the transition to 1997 when the PRI lost control over the chamber 
of deputies. 
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to bring politics and policy closer to citizens (Grindle 2000, 2007; 
Rodríguez 1997; Selee 2006, 2011). Revised national electoral rules low-
ered the barriers to entry to opposition parties, while the legitimacy of 
electoral processes was improved through the creation and regulation of 
the independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) between 1990 and 
1994. National autocrats required state autocrats to do the same, as part 
of decentralizing reforms.  
However, national autocrats also undertook constitutional reforms 
in 1983 and 1992 to allow state governments to adopt bottom-up-
designed participatory institutions as a part of their politically decentral-
izing reforms. Although most states chose not to take this additional 
step, a few did formalize participatory rules into law. In 1984, PRI auto-
crats in the state of Puebla authorized sub-municipal hamlet-level gov-
ernments to select local authorities via plebiscite. In 1992, PRI autocrats 
in the Morelos authorized some sub-municipal hamlet governments to 
select authorities using participatory rules. In 1995, PRI autocrats in 
Oaxaca authorized some municipalities to create participatory institu-
tions to select municipal governments. In 1998, PRI autocrats in Tlaxcala 
allowed some sub-municipal hamlet governments to use participatory 
institutions to select their authorities. In 1999, state leaders in Chiapas 
allowed indigenous communities to select local leaders using local cus-
tomary laws.  
I test the argument using data from Oaxaca. There are three reasons 
why Oaxaca is a good case for study. First, electoral data capturing the 
level of regime support – as well as crucial control variables – are availa-
ble at the municipal level, in contrast to the less well-defined sub-
municipal hamlet or community levels that would be required to examine 
participatory institutions in the other states listed above. Second, the 
assignment of bottom-up participatory institutions across the state’s 570 
municipalities is well documented between 1997 and 2012, the years 
under study here. Between 1995 and 1996, state authorities in Oaxaca 
identified 412 (rising to 418 in 1997; falling to 417 in 2012) municipalities 
that would be authorized to create participatory institutions – calling 
them “Usos y Costumbres” or “Uses and Customs” (UyC) systems – 
and 158 (falling to 152 in 1997; rising to 153 in 2012) municipalities that 
would be required to use top-down-designed representative democratic 
systems – calling them “Partidos Políticos” or “Political Parties” (PP) 
systems. 
Third, the difference between Oaxaca’s bottom-up-designed UyC 
systems and its top-down-designed PP systems is well established. Oaxa-
ca’s UyC and PP municipalities must follow the national constitution and 
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select a mayor, a local municipal council (aldermen), and a community 
representative (síndico, a type of ombudsman). However, incumbent UyC 
officials are allowed to design their own participatory mechanisms for 
selecting governments and making policy decisions entirely from the 
bottom-up, leading to considerable variation across UyC municipalities. 
Oaxaca’s UyC systems select officials during a municipal town-hall meet-
ing known as an Asamblea General Comunal or General Community As-
sembly (AGC). The AGC is run by a supervisory board (Mesa de Debates) 
comprised of incumbent municipal officials and sometimes elders’ coun-
cils. However, each municipal board determines its rules for selecting 
candidates for municipal offices and the mechanism for selecting be-
tween them. It can restrict the voting pool by sex, age, marital status, 
birth and/or residency requirements, and satisfactory participation in 
local unpaid community service (tequio). It can restrict the candidate pool 
for municipal offices according to these same criteria, and by satisfactory 
fulfillment of unpaid community administrative positions (cargos). Each 
municipal board also chooses its voting mechanism for selecting munici-
pal officials, and can use a range of mechanisms from secret ballots to 
publicly cast votes (the most common). Municipal boards also decide 
whether sub-municipal hamlets will share municipal officials with the 
municipal seat or whether they will be allowed to design their own UyC 
rules to select their own leaders to report to municipal officials.  
Incumbent PP municipal officials must oversee the selection of 
municipal governments via the ballot box using a common set of state 
electoral rules that respect universal political rights and secret ballots; 
that is, liberal representative democratic institutions. The formal assign-
ment of PP systems in 1995–1996 allowed top-down political decentrali-
zation compared to prior years, given that it occurred just after state 
electoral reforms (1990–1994), creating a newly independent electoral 
institute. Improved electoral integrity allowed opposition parties to freely 
compete for and win municipal elections in PP systems for the first time. 
Thus, Oaxaca’s top-down-designed PP systems enjoyed a type of top-
down political decentralization, although it was not as extensive as that 
enjoyed in bottom-up-designed UyC systems. State authorities reserved 
the right to authorize the use of UyC systems at the sub-municipal ham-
let level in PP municipalities (Fox 2007), as well as the right to overturn 
municipal or sub-municipal processes.  
Oaxaca’s state electoral reforms represented an important break 
from the past, when state autocrats centrally managed municipal political 
processes across the state. State autocrats determined party candidate 
slates in municipalities facing internal PRI divisions or anti-regime forces 
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(Anaya Muñoz 2006; Martínez Vásquez and Díaz Montes 2001; Recondo 
2007, 2008), with election outcomes engineered using the state electoral 
apparatus. State autocrats allowed local strongmen to construct party 
slates in places deemed free from internal PRI divisions and anti-regime 
forces, with local strongmen registering PRI slates as having received 100 
percent support without holding formal elections (Anaya Muñoz 2006; 
Martínez Vásquez and Díaz Montes 2001; Recondo 2007, 2008). In the 
early 1990s, however, rising anti-PRI support amidst the armed insur-
gency in neighboring Chiapas encouraged Oaxaca’s state officials to 
change their approach to managing elections (Anaya Muñoz 2005, 2006; 
Eisenstadt 2011; Recondo 2007) and to decentralize electoral outcomes 
throughout the state, selecting 412 municipalities in 1995–1996 for high-
ly decentralized bottom-up-designed participatory rule and 158 for top-
down-designed PP systems.  
Several scholars have argued that the formal assignment of UyC sys-
tems ensured the survival of local strongmen and thus local PRI rule in 
these places (Bailón Corres 1999; Bartra 1999; Benton 2012; Fox 2007; 
Recondo 2007). The fact that the PRI ruled Oaxaca until 2010, despite 
national democratization in 2000, suggests that UyC reforms may have 
contributed to state PRI survival. However, anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that local citizens were able to use UyC institutions to under-
mine local strongmen and thus local PRI domination as well (see 
Eisenstadt 2011 for a summary of this research). To explain these con-
tradictory findings, I explain how bottom-up-designed UyC institutions 
delivered different effects on regime support depending on whether they 
were placed in pro- or anti-regime hands. In so doing, this study diverges 
from Benton (2012), who did not distinguish between how the place-
ment of UyC and PP systems in pro- and anti-PRI hands might lead to 
differential effects on PRI support. I argue that the bottom-up or top-
down design of authoritarian institutions interacts with the placement of 
these institutions in pro-regime or anti-regime hands to determine the 
strength and direction of their impact on authoritarian rule.  
This argument means we should observe two things. First, we 
should observe greater PRI support, greater winning margins, and great-
er abstention in bottom-up-designed UyC compared to top-down-
designed PP systems among municipalities in PRI hands. As local PRI 
officials are given the decentralized political tools with which to channel 
citizens’ demands on behalf of the regime, they should be better able to 
manage PRI regime support, and through this the party’s capacity to win 
elections. However, because authoritarian participatory institutions are 
designed to gauge and channel citizen demands, autocrats should use 
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them to dampen political participation that could turn against the regime, 
with bottom-up-designed UyC institutions more effectively achieving 
this goal (abstention) than top-down-designed PP systems. These expec-
tations are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. The Relative Political Impact of UyC and PP Institutions in Oaxa-
ca, Mexico 
  Institutional Design 
  Bottom-Up UyC vs. Top-Down PP 
PRI Support 
PRI Hands  > 
Opposition Hands  < 
First Place 
Margins 
PRI Hands  > 
Opposition Hands  > 
Abstention 
PRI Hands  > 
Opposition Hands  > 
 
Second, it means we should observe greater opposition support, greater 
winning margins, and greater abstention in bottom-up-designed UyC 
than in top-down-designed PP municipalities among municipalities in 
opposition hands. As local opposition leaders are given the decentralized 
political tools through which to channel citizens’ demands away from the 
regime, they should be better able to manage opposition support and 
participation for and against them, increasing their capacity to wrest 
control away from authoritarian rulers. However, because participatory 
institutions in authoritarian regimes are designed to gauge and channel 
citizen demands, opposition leaders should use them to dampen political 
participation that threatens to undo their anti-regime gains, with bottom-
up-designed institutions like UyC systems more effective in this regard 
than top-down-designed systems like PP ones. These expectations are 
summarized in Table 2. 
In building this argument, I diverge from research on Oaxaca’s UyC 
systems in two ways. Scholars have noted that PRI autocrats assigned 
UyC systems among their localities, while opposition leaders were al-
lowed to determine whether to assign UyC systems among places under 
their control (Anaya Muñoz 2006; Benton 2016; Recondo 2007, 2008). 
Given the divergent political interests of pro-regime and anti-regime 
officials, UyC systems should have been used to different political ends 
in pro- and anti-regime hands. However, as noted, no one has yet made 
this distinction. Studies examining the impact of UyC systems on politi-
cal behavior in Oaxaca do not distinguish between how these systems 
worked in PRI and opposition hands (e.g., Benton 2012; Hiskey and 
Goodman 2011).  
  Evidence from Electoral Authoritarian Oaxaca 49
 

 
Studies of Oaxaca’s UyC systems also usually attribute differences in 
political behavior in these systems compared to PP ones to general, 
overarching differences between them. For example, Benton (2012) 
highlighted how the exclusion of political parties in UyC systems (begin-
ning in 1997) allowed UyC leaders to manage the direction of communi-
ty debate and prevent partisan intrusion in local political affairs. Others 
might argue that it is the use of the AGC town hall meeting that distin-
guishes between UyC and PP systems. In contrast, my argument empha-
sizes how it is the capacity of UyC system leaders to design their institu-
tions from the bottom up that facilitates their capacity to manage the 
direction of community debate and prevent partisan intrusion in their 
affairs, thereby separating them from PP systems in this way. In other 
words, it is the endogenous nature of UyC systems, which varies consid-
erably across locality, that enables local UyC leaders to manage citizen 
demands more easily than their counterparts in PP systems. 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to compare the effect of 
bottom-up-designed UyC with that of top-down-designed PP institu-
tions in pro-regime and anti-regime hands in Oaxaca’s electoral authori-
tarian regime. To this end, I analyze municipal-level election results for 
state deputies after the 1995 UyC reform, specifically the share of PRI 
support, first-place party margins, and abstention in 1998, 2001, 2004, 
2007, and 2010.4 Gubernatorial elections were coterminous with state 
deputy elections in 1998, 2004, and 2010. I examine state elections be-
cause municipal election results were not recorded by party in UyC sys-
tems from 1997 onward. Although UyC systems apply to municipal 
political processes, they have been shown to affect voting behavior in 
higher-level (federal) elections (e.g., Benton 2012; Hiskey and Goodman 
2011). This is not surprising given that scholars have shown that local 
electoral rules (e.g., Jones 1997) and political practices (e.g., Chandra 
2004) affect political behavior at higher levels in both democratic and 
authoritarian systems. 
The principal explanatory variables are the presence of UyC or PP 
institutions in the municipality, whether these systems were placed in 
PRI or opposition hands at the time of UyC adoption, and an interaction 
between the two. The UyC municipality variable is a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the municipality was assigned a UyC system and 0 if the mu-
                                                 
4  Data from IEEPCO.  
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nicipality was assigned a PP system during the initial 1995–1996 assign-
ment period (and a couple of changes in 1997, when seven municipalities 
were reassigned UyC institutions and one reassigned PP institutions). A 
dummy variable records whether the municipalities were in PRI (1) or 
opposition (0) hands at the time of UyC and PP assignment between 
1995 and 1997. State autocrats used the 1995 state elections to determine 
whether the municipality was in PRI hands when making the original 
UyC and PP assignment decisions (Anaya Muñoz 2006). 
I include a series of variables to account for the endogenous nature 
of UyC and PP assignment. Quantitative analysis of the impact of politi-
cal, social, and demographic variables on UyC assignment shows that 
UyC placement was prioritized in socially stable places with strong but 
declining PRI support (Benton 2016). In addition to whether the munic-
ipality was under PRI control, I include the change in PRI support be-
tween 1992 and 1995, as well as dummy variables noting the presence of 
social conflict after state and municipal elections.5 Although research 
shows that political and social concerns were crucial for UyC assignment, 
other social and demographic factors may have mattered, such as the 
share of population that is indigenous and its concentration6 in a single 
group, the share of population that is catholic, the share of the popula-
tion living in rural areas and on communal lands, poverty rates, migration 
rates, and municipal population size (Benton 2016).7 Many of these vari-
ables have also been shown to affect PRI support and abstention rates 
(Klesner and Lawson 2001). Finally, I include the effective number of 
parties and the trend in PRI support, as these also matter for voting 
outcomes. A test for collinearity among all independent variables shows 
that the mean Variation Inflation Index (VIF) was 1.53 (with none of the 
variables’ VIF above 1.46).  
The results for the OLS models examining the impact of institu-
tional design and political control on regime support, winning margins, 
and abstention rates are found in Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively. To ease 
hypothesis testing, I also present the predicted values associated with the 
linear combinations of the UyC municipality dummy, the PRI control 
dummy, and their interaction term in Table 6. As shown in that table, 
winning margins were consistently higher in UyC compared to PP sys-
tems in PRI-run municipalities across the years, in line with expectations. 
In PRI-run municipalities, for example, winning parties enjoyed 32 per-
                                                 
5  Todd Eisenstadt kindly shared post-election conflict data. 
6  I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration, ranging from 0 
(no indigenous group members) to 1 (unified indigenous group). 
7  Data from INEGI and CONAPO. 
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cent greater support on average than runner-up parties in UyC systems 
compared to a lower 21 percent greater support in PP systems in 1998. 
Abstention was 54 percent on average in PRI-run UyC systems, com-
pared to 46 percent in PRI-run PP systems in 1998 as well. These pat-
terns persisted over time, showing that PRI-affiliated municipal leaders 
in bottom-up-designed UyC systems enjoyed a significantly greater ca-
pacity to channel political support – through their management of politi-
cal rights and public ballots – compared to their colleagues who relied on 
top-down-designed PP systems.  
Table 6 shows that PRI-run UyC municipalities delivered 3 percent 
greater PRI support on average compared to opposition-run places in 
1998 (55 percent PRI support compared to 52 percent PRI support) and 
2 percent greater PRI support on average in 2001 (53 percent compared 
to 51 percent); this is in line with expectations that UyC institutions 
placed in pro-PRI hands would deliver greater support for the PRI. 
However, this additional support is small, while PRI-run UyC municipal-
ities did not continue to deliver it over time. In view of the consistently 
much larger winning margins in PRI-run UyC municipalities compared 
to PP ones, these results reveal two things. First, many, if not most, 
leaders of PRI-run UyC municipalities used their control over UyC insti-
tutions to favor the state PRI regime initially after UyC reform. Howev-
er, many UyC leaders switched political allegiances, lowering the level of 
PRI support in PRI-run UyC municipalities relative to first-place mar-
gins. This is not surprising; municipal leaders in UyC systems often show 
no partisan preference (Bailón Corres 1999; Bartra 1999; Recondo 2007), 
with seemingly pro-PRI incumbents using UyC institutions to channel 
support to opposition groups and seemingly anti-PRI leaders using UyC 
institutions to channel support to the PRI. Even if municipal leaders 
used bottom-up-designed UyC systems to strengthen their political con-
trol, varying but declining PRI loyalty would result in initially small and 
later insignificant differences in PRI-support over time. 
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Table 3. UyC Municipal Institutions, PRI Municipal Control, and PRI Sup-
port in Oaxaca 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
UyC Municipality 
Dummy -0.0209 0.0474* -0.0419 0.0222 -0.0542* 
 (0.0256) (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0292) (0.0277) 
PRI Control Dummy 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.0301 0.0471* 0.0359 
 (0.0218) (0.0226) (0.0236) (0.0248) (0.0235) 
UyC Municipality * PRI 
Control 0.0537** -0.0245 0.0541* -0.0108 0.0301 
 (0.0257) (0.0270) (0.0279) (0.0293) (0.0279) 
Change PRI 1992-1995 0.232*** 0.0377 0.0230 0.0325 0.0785*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0264) (0.0276) (0.0287) (0.0272) 
Conflicts 1989 0.0206 -0.0171 -0.0167 -0.00216 0.00732 
 (0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0191) (0.0182) 
Conflicts 1992 0.000835 0.0196 0.0165 0.00816 -0.00258 
 (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0152) 
Conflicts 1995 -0.00700 -0.00241 0.0158 0.00989 0.0157 
 (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0122) 
Conflicts Prior Election -0.00670 -0.00823 0.00160 0.00859 
 (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0144) (0.0137) 
Chg. PRI Support Prior 
Election 0.571*** 0.338*** -0.0696*** 0.144*** 0.355*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0280) (0.0218) (0.0150) (0.0314) 
Effective Number of 
Parties -0.129*** -0.104*** -0.202*** -0.0655*** -0.0796*** 
 (0.00834) (0.00537) (0.0122) (0.00492) (0.0105) 
Rural Population -0.00552 -0.0168 -0.0224 -0.0392** -0.0113 
 (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0197) (0.0188) 
Communal Lands 
Population -0.0295 -0.0100 0.0410 0.0635** 0.0587** 
 (0.0263) (0.0277) (0.0285) (0.0301) (0.0286) 
Indigenous Population 0.00669 -0.00711 0.0178 -0.0340** -0.0688*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0167) (0.0158) 
Indigenous Concentra-
tion -0.0258 -0.00665 -0.00489 0.0405* 0.00166 
 (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0231) 
Catholic Population -0.0321 -0.115*** -0.0138 -0.0968** -0.149*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0417) (0.0438) (0.0451) (0.0428) 
Poverty Index 0.0248*** 0.0142** 0.0209*** 0.00521 0.0214*** 
 (0.00632) (0.00664) (0.00678) (0.00715) (0.00674) 
Migration Index 0.00301 -0.00461 0.00436 0.00207 -0.00229 
 (0.00440) (0.00456) (0.00470) (0.00497) (0.00472) 
Municipal Population -0.0104* -0.0139** -0.0212*** -0.0184*** -0.0309*** 
 (0.00544) (0.00567) (0.00606) (0.00617) (0.00577) 
Constant 0.885*** 0.932*** 1.123*** 0.877*** 1.047*** 
 (0.0698) (0.0728) (0.0763) (0.0795) (0.0770) 
Observations 566 565 566 568 569 
R-Squared 0.665 0.671 0.510 0.484 0.410 
Note:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dependent Variable: Share of PRI sup-
port. Observations do not total 570 due to missing data. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01..  
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Table 4. UyC Municipal Institutions, PRI Municipal Control, and First Place 
Margins in Oaxaca 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
UyC Municipality 
Dummy 0.140*** 0.162*** 0.119*** 0.133*** 0.0485 
 (0.0344) (0.0336) (0.0341) (0.0446) (0.0340) 
PRI Control Dummy 0.113*** 0.0792*** 0.0183 0.0544 -0.0295 
 (0.0294) (0.0281) (0.0290) (0.0378) (0.0288) 
UyC Municipality * 
PRI Control -0.0334 -0.0202 -0.00613 -0.0393 0.0214 
 (0.0346) (0.0335) (0.0342) (0.0447) (0.0342) 
Change PRI 1992-1995 0.0642* -0.0492 -0.0140 0.0444 0.00255 
 (0.0380) (0.0329) (0.0339) (0.0437) (0.0334) 
Conflicts 1989 0.0352 0.0158 -0.0179 0.0131 0.000708 
 (0.0229) (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0292) (0.0223) 
Conflicts 1992 0.00191 0.0382** 0.0281 0.00414 0.0126 
 (0.0189) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0244) (0.0187) 
Conflicts 1995 -0.0721*** -0.00375 -0.00314 -0.0184 -0.0133 
 (0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0197) (0.0150) 
Conflicts Prior Elec-
tion  -0.0342** -0.0277* -0.00674 -0.0000756 
  (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0219) (0.0168) 
Chg. PRI Support 
Prior Election 0.145*** 0.167*** -0.0367 0.132*** -0.0144 
 (0.0445) (0.0349) (0.0268) (0.0228) (0.0386) 
Effective Number of 
Parties -0.276*** -0.165*** -0.333*** -0.0662*** -0.196*** 
 (0.0112) (0.00667) (0.0149) (0.00750) (0.0129) 
Rural Population -0.0360 -0.0170 -0.0541** -0.0494 -0.0581** 
 (0.0233) (0.0225) (0.0231) (0.0301) (0.0230) 
Communal Lands 
Population -0.0456 0.0360 -0.00240 0.0789* 0.0600* 
 (0.0353) (0.0345) (0.0350) (0.0459) (0.0350) 
Indigenous Population 0.0129 0.0490** 0.0520*** 0.0137 0.0376* 
 (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0254) (0.0194) 
Indigenous Concentra-
tion 0.00641 0.00533 -0.0437 0.0193 -0.0257 
 (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0283) (0.0373) (0.0283) 
Catholic Population 0.151*** -0.0594 0.133** -0.0895 0.0218 
 (0.0540) (0.0518) (0.0538) (0.0688) (0.0525) 
Poverty Index 0.0417*** 0.000997 0.0566 *** 0.0125 0.0291*** 
 (0.00849) (0.00826) (0.00833) (0.0109) (0.00827) 
Migration Index 0.00703 -0.0151*** -0.00604 0.00618 -0.0181*** 
 (0.00592) (0.00566) (0.00577) (0.00759) (0.00579) 
Municipal Population -0.0116 -0.0102 -0.0113 -0.0189** -0.0215*** 
 (0.00731) (0.00705) (0.00744) (0.00941) (0.00708) 
Constant 0.759*** 0.700*** 0.890*** 0.584*** 0.790*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0905) (0.0937) (0.121) (0.0945) 
Observations 566 565 566 568 569 
R-Squared 0.674 0.682 0.606 0.324 0.420 
Note:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dependent Variable: Share of PRI sup-
port. Observations do not total 570 due to missing data. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. UyC Municipal Institutions, PRI Municipal Control, and Abstention 
in Oaxaca 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
UyC Municipality 
Dummy 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.132*** 0.0998*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0310) (0.0280) (0.0282) (0.0285) 
PRI Control Dummy 0.0463* 0.00125 0.0314 -0.0133 -0.00439 
 (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0242) 
UyC Municipality * 
PRI Control -0.0422 0.00708 -0.0344 -0.00219 -0.00782 
 (0.0304) (0.0310) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0287) 
Change PRI 1992-1995 0.00694 -0.0222 -0.0396 -0.0643** -0.0467* 
 (0.0334) (0.0304) (0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0280) 
Conflicts 1989 0.00385 0.0353* 0.0238 0.00863 0.0102 
 (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0187) 
Conflicts 1992 0.0112 -0.0182 0.00132 -0.00509 0.00429 
 (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0156) 
Conflicts 1995 -0.00802 -0.00366 -0.00972 -0.00385 -0.0297** 
 (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0125) 
Conflicts Prior Elec-
tion  -0.0116 -0.0374*** -0.0226 -0.0135 
  (0.0137) (0.0127) (0.0139) (0.0141) 
Chg. PRI Support 
Prior Election 0.00623 0.0280 0.0200 0.00842 -0.165*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0322) (0.0220) (0.0144) (0.0323) 
Effective Number of 
Parties 0.0487*** 0.0359*** 0.0484*** 0.0151*** 0.0220** 
 (0.00987) (0.00616) (0.0123) (0.00474) (0.0108) 
Rural Population -0.0552*** -0.0493** -0.0524*** -0.0707*** -0.0428** 
 (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0193) 
Communal Lands 
Population -0.101*** -0.0791** -0.0129 -0.0725** -0.0431 
 (0.0311) (0.0318) (0.0287) (0.0290) (0.0294) 
Indigenous Population -0.0273 -0.0279 -0.0242 -0.0310* -0.0333** 
 (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0162) 
Indigenous Concentra-
tion -0.00105 -0.0188 0.0224 0.0140 0.0119 
 (0.0252) (0.0255) (0.0232) (0.0236) (0.0237) 
Catholic Population 0.0663 0.0676 0.0602 -0.0289 0.0652 
 (0.0475) (0.0479) (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0440) 
Poverty Index 0.0426*** -0.0276*** 0.00767 -0.0123* 0.00854 
 (0.00747) (0.00763) (0.00684) (0.00689) (0.00693) 
Migration Index 0.0278*** 0.0191*** 0.0353*** 0.0321*** 0.0425*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00523) (0.00474) (0.00480) (0.00485) 
Municipal Population 0.0148** 0.0406*** 0.00696 0.0265*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.00644) (0.00651) (0.00611) (0.00595) (0.00593) 
Constant 0.176** 0.179** 0.246*** 0.403*** 0.0531 
 (0.0826) (0.0836) (0.0770) (0.0767) (0.0792) 
Observations 566 565 566 568 569 
R-Squared 0.234 0.314 0.249 0.262 0.456 
Note:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dependent Variable: Share of PRI sup-
port. Observations do not total 570 due to missing data. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6. Predicted PRI Support, Winning Margins, and Abstention in  
Oaxaca, Mexico 
 1998 State Elections 2001 State Elections 2004 State Elections 
PRI Support 
 UyC vs PP UyC vs PP UyC vs PP 
PRI-Run 0.55*** > 0.52*** 0.53*** > 0.51*** 0.53*** = 0.52*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPP-Run 0.35*** = 0.38*** 0.46*** = 0.41*** 0.45*** = 0.49*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Winning Margins 
 UyC vs PP UyC vs PP UyC vs PP 
PRI-Run 0.32*** > 0.21*** 0.36*** > 0.22*** 0.27*** > 0.16*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPP-Run 0.24*** > 0.10*** 0.30*** > 0.14*** 0.26*** > 0.14*** 
 (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) 
Abstention 
 UyC vs PP UyC vs PP UyC vs PP 
PRI-Run 0.54*** > 0.46*** 0.68*** > 0.56*** 0.56*** > 0.46*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPP-Run 0.54*** > 0.41*** 0.67*** > 0.56*** 0.56*** > 0.43*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) 
 
 2007 State Elections 2010 State Elections 
PRI Support 
 UyC vs PP UyC vs PP 
PRI-Run 0.52*** = 0.51*** 0.45*** = 0.48*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPP-Run 0.49*** = 0.46*** 0.39*** = 0.44*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Winning Margins 
 UyC vs PP UyC vs PP 
PRI-Run 0.31*** > 0.22*** 0.21*** > 0.14*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPP-Run 0.30*** > 0.16*** 0.21*** > 0.17*** 
 (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02)  (0.03) 
Abstention 
 UyC vs PP UyC vs PP 
PRI-Run 0.63*** > 0.54*** 0.53*** > 0.31*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
OPP-Run 0.65*** > 0.55*** 0.54*** > 0.32*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Note:  Standard Errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The term 
“vs.” refers to whether the two predicted values were statistically different from 
one another and in what direction, with an inequality sign indicating a signifi-
cant difference and its direction, and an equal sign (=) indicating no significant 
difference. 
Among opposition-run municipalities, winning margins and abstention 
rates were consistently higher in UyC than in PP municipalities across 
the years as well, in line with expectations. In 1998, for example, winning 
parties in opposition-run UyC municipalities enjoyed 24 percent greater 
support on average than runner-up parties; this is in contrast to winning 
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parties in opposition-run PP systems, which only enjoyed 10 percent 
greater support. Abstention rates averaged 54 percent in opposition-run 
UyC systems compared to 51 percent in opposition-run PP systems in 
1998 as well. Regardless of whether in PRI or opposition hands, bottom-
up-designed UyC systems gave municipal leaders the capacity to channel 
citizen support to a greater degree than their counterparts in PP systems, 
as argued.  
However, opposition-led UyC municipalities did not generally use 
their control over bottom-up-designed UyC institutions to engineer 
support away from the state PRI regime; this was in contrast to expecta-
tions. The level of PRI support in opposition-run UyC systems was not 
statistically different from that in PP municipalities in any year under 
examination. Although contrary to expectations, the finding that opposi-
tion UyC municipal leaders delivered high margins – manipulating politi-
cal participation in this regard – demonstrates their greater level of polit-
ical control compared to opposition PP leaders, even if they did not 
always use this control against the PRI. This is not surprising, given that 
UyC leaders often showed no particular partisan preference. 
Addressing Alternative Interpretations 
Despite providing evidence in favor of the argument, the above results 
are consistent with another interpretation. It could be the case that the 
institutions comprising Oaxaca’s UyC systems, especially the AGC town 
meeting, are a mechanism for generating consensus rather for manipulat-
ing support. Once consensus is reached, citizens on the “losing” side 
may refrain from voting, which would produce the observed differences 
in winning margins and abstention rates in UyC compared to PP systems 
noted. To strengthen the conclusion that bottom-up-designed UyC sys-
tems facilitated political control, I analyze the “flow of votes” between 
parties between elections using ecological regression (Lau, Moore, and 
Kellermann 2007; Rosen et al. 2001).8  
In a clean election, in which voters cast ballots according to their 
political preferences, the “flow of votes” between parties from one elec-
tion to the next should make sense, with no particular party receiving 
unexplainable transfers of support (Cantú 2013; Myagkov, Ordeshook, 
and Shakin 2009). In contrast, if Oaxaca’s UyC systems increase the 
capacity of municipal leaders to manage citizen support to a greater ex-
                                                 
8  Ecological regression analysis addresses problems of aggregation bias and cor-
related errors within and across systems of equations. 
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tent than their counterparts in PP systems, the flow of votes between 
parties should occur in ways that are consistent with this logic. Specifical-
ly, if bottom-up-designed UyC institutions improve the capacity of mu-
nicipal leaders to engineer support, we should see signs that municipal 
UyC leaders are better at preventing defections and at forcing those 
unwilling to comply with their orders into the ranks of abstainers. If 
bottom-up-designed UyC rules do not give municipal leaders greater 
capacity to engineer political support compared to leaders in PP systems, 
we should not observe such differences and the flow of votes between 
parties should be similar across UyC and PP systems.  
To examine the flow of votes, I separate Oaxaca’s municipalities in-
to four groups: those under PRI rule at the time of UyC adoption that 
stayed in PRI hands between elections (Table 7); those under opposi-
tion-rule at the time of UyC adoption that remained in opposition hands 
(Table 8); those under PRI rule at the time of UyC adoption that shifted 
to the opposition (Table 9); and those under opposition rule at the time 
of UyC adoption that shifted to the PRI (Table 10). Table 7 presents the 
results for the municipalities that remained under PRI rule between elec-
tions. If bottom-up-designed UyC systems facilitated greater political 
control compared to PP systems, then the flow of votes to the opposi-
tion (defections against UyC municipal leader commands) should be 
considerably lower among UyC than among PP systems and the flow of 
votes from the PRI to abstainers should be considerably greater among 
UyC than among PP systems. This was the case across the years. Be-
tween 1998 and 2001 the flow of votes from opposition parties to ab-
stainers was a greater 59 percent in UyC compared to 57 percent in PP 
systems, while the flow of votes from the PRI to the opposition (against 
municipal leaders’ wishes) was a lower 16 percent in UyC systems com-
pared to 21 percent in PP ones. This pattern was repeated in subsequent 
years. 
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Table 7. The Flow of Votes in UyC and PP Municipalities with Municipal 
PRI Party Continuity between Elections (PRI to PRI) 
UyC Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.65 0.03 0.36 0.04 
Opp. 2001 0.16 0.36 0.34 0.06 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 
Abst. 2001 0.19 0.59 0.19 0.90 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.71 0.30 0.28 0.13 
Opp. 2004 0.07 0.58 0.22 0.12 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.01 
Abst. 2004 0.21 0.12 0.25 0.75 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.65 0.21 0.04 0.03 
Opp. 2007 0.14 0.51 0.82 0.05 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Abst. 2007 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.92 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.65 0.21 0.04 0.03 
Opp. 2010 0.14 0.51 0.82 0.05 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Abst. 2010 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.92 
 
PP Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.69 0.06 0.22 0.02 
Opp. 2001 0.21 0.36 0.34 0.05 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.01 
Abst. 2001 0.09 0.57 0.24 0.92 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.73 0.19 0.15 0.16 
Opp. 2004 0.15 0.63 0.52 0.14 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.01 
Abst. 2004 0.11 0.16 0.20 0.68 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.62 0.08 0.26 0.07 
Opp. 2007 0.20 0.41 0.29 0.08 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.01 
Abst. 2007 0.17 0.49 0.25 0.84 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.59 0.40 0.26 0.19 
Opp. 2010 0.33 0.51 0.20 0.24 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.01 
Abst. 2010 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.56 
Note:  Non-Reg. refers to non-registered candidates. 
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Table 8. The Flow of Votes in UyC and PP Municipalities with Municipal 
Opposition Party Continuity between Elections (Opposition to 
Opposition) 
UyC Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.04 
Opp. 2001 0.10 0.63 0.46 0.02 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.03 0.01 0.17 0.01 
Abst. 2001 0.66 0.28 0.22 0.93 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.20 0.12 0.25 0.14 
Opp. 2004 0.65 0.33 0.25 0.22 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.01 
Abst. 2004 0.12 0.52 0.25 0.62 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.21 0.10 0.12 0.08 
Opp. 2007 0.11 0.59 0.62 0.11 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.01 
Abst. 2007 0.65 0.29 0.16 0.80 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.61 0.13 0.24 0.08 
Opp. 2010 0.14 0.69 0.26 0.20 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.01 
Abst. 2010 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.71 
 
PP Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.30 0.11 0.25 0.07 
Opp. 2001 0.29 0.50 0.25 0.05 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.04 0.02 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2001 0.38 0.37 0.25 0.85 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.15 0.31 0.25 0.17 
Opp. 2004 0.42 0.44 0.25 0.23 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2004 0.38 0.23 0.25 0.59 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.07 
Opp. 2007 0.32 0.52 0.24 0.05 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.02 
Abst. 2007 0.45 0.19 0.25 0.86 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.68 0.19 0.25 0.19 
Opp. 2010 0.21 0.73 0.25 0.26 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.02 0.01 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2010 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.54 
Note:  Non-Reg. refers to non-registered candidates. 
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Table 9. The Flow of Votes in UyC and PP Municipalities with Municipal 
Partisan Affiliation Change (PRI to Opposition) 
UyC Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.04 
Opp. 2001 0.49 0.20 0.25 0.12 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2001 0.36 0.63 0.25 0.83 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.13 
Opp. 2004 0.32 0.52 0.29 0.23 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.01 
Abst. 2004 0.44 0.22 0.25 0.63 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.29 0.10 0.17 0.07 
Opp. 2007 0.54 0.46 0.51 0.09 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.01 
Abst. 2007 0.15 0.41 0.20 0.83 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.10 
Opp. 2010 0.39 0.70 0.26 0.16 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 
Abst. 2010 0.29 0.04 0.25 0.73 
 
PP Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.34 0.11 0.26 0.08 
Opp. 2001 0.57 0.18 0.25 0.08 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.02 0.04 0.24 0.03 
Abst. 2001 0.08 0.67 0.25 0.82 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.40 0.47 0.02 0.11 
Opp. 2004 0.24 0.38 0.03 0.35 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Abst. 2004 0.18 0.25 0.01 0.57 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.32 0.17 0.25 0.09 
Opp. 2007 0.37 0.43 0.25 0.11 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.03 
Abst. 2007 0.28 0.36 0.25 0.78 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.46 0.28 0.24 0.19 
Opp. 2010 0.49 0.56 0.26 0.30 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.01 
Abst. 2010 0.05 0.14 0.25 0.50 
Note:  Non-Reg. refers to non-registered candidates. 
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Table 10. The Flow of Votes in UyC and PP Municipalities with Municipal 
Partisan Affiliation Change (Opposition to PRI) 
UyC Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.10 0.43 0.31 0.04 
Opp. 2001 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.03 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.01 
Abst. 2001 0.61 0.29 0.24 0.91 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.19 0.50 0.28 0.16 
Opp. 2004 0.17 0.39 0.25 0.13 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.06 0.01 0.23 0.01 
Abst. 2004 0.58 0.09 0.25 0.70 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.30 0.27 0.16 0.10 
Opp. 2007 0.35 0.30 0.50 0.06 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Abst. 2007 0.34 0.42 0.21 0.83 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.66 0.26 0.24 0.15 
Opp. 2010 0.07 0.39 0.26 0.23 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2010 0.24 0.33 0.25 0.60 
 
PP Systems 
 PRI 1998 Opp. 1998 Non-Reg. 1998 Abst. 1998 
PRI 2001 0.61 0.08 0.25 0.03 
Opp. 2001 0.22 0.36 0.25 0.05 
Non-Reg. 2001 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2001 0.15 0.54 0.25 0.90 
 PRI 2001 Opp. 2001 Non-Reg. 2001 Abst. 2001 
PRI 2004 0.63 0.31 0.25 0.13 
Opp. 2004 0.21 0.51 0.25 0.14 
Non-Reg. 2004 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2004 0.13 0.16 0.25 0.70 
 PRI 2004 Opp. 2004 Non-Reg. 2004 Abst. 2004 
PRI 2007 0.49 0.18 0.24 0.06 
Opp. 2007 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.09 
Non-Reg. 2007 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.01 
Abst. 2007 0.23 0.48 0.25 0.84 
 PRI 2007 Opp. 2007 Non-Reg. 2007 Abst. 2007 
PRI 2010 0.28 0.46 0.25 0.28 
Opp. 2010 0.49 0.33 0.25 0.31 
Non-Reg. 2010 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.02 
Abst. 2010 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.38 
Note:  Non-Reg. refers to non-registered candidates. 
Table 8 presents results for those municipalities that remained under 
opposition control between elections. If bottom-up-designed UyC sys-
tems facilitated greater political control compared to PP systems, then 
the flow of votes from the opposition to the PRI should be considerably 
lower among UyC than among PP systems and the flow of votes from 
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the opposition to abstainers should be considerably greater among UyC 
than among PP systems. As expected, this tended to be the case. Table 9 
shows results for municipalities that shifted partisan control from the 
PRI to the opposition between elections. If bottom-up-designed UyC 
systems facilitated greater political control compared to PP systems, then 
the flow of votes from the PRI to the PRI should be considerably lower 
among UyC compared to PP systems and/or the flow of votes from the 
PRI to abstainers should be considerably greater in UyC compared to PP 
systems. This was also generally the case. Table 10 shows results for 
municipalities that shifted partisan control from the opposition to the 
PRI between elections. If bottom-up-designed UyC systems facilitated 
greater political control compared to PP systems, then the flow of votes 
from the opposition to the opposition should be considerably lower 
among UyC compared to PP systems and the flow of votes from the 
opposition to abstainers should be considerably greater in UyC com-
pared to PP systems. Again, this tended to be the case.  
Conclusion 
The original aim of this study was to examine the impact of participatory 
institutions on authoritarian rule. Joining research on democratic and 
authoritarian political decentralization and participatory institutions, I 
have argued that when authoritarian participatory institutions are de-
signed from the bottom up and placed in pro-regime hands, pro-regime 
officials can better tailor these institutions in ways to favor authoritarian 
rule than they can when these institutions are designed from the top 
down. When participatory institutions are designed from the bottom up 
but placed in anti-regime hands, anti-regime officials can better tailor 
these institutions to the peculiarities of local political dynamics and use 
them to undermine national authoritarian rule better than they can when 
these institutions are designed and given to them from the top down.  
Statistical analysis of municipal level voting behavior in Mexico’s 
electoral authoritarian state of Oaxaca, whose leaders implemented par-
ticipatory reforms during the last decade of national electoral authoritari-
an rule, provides evidence in support of the argument. Pro-regime lead-
ers in municipalities enjoying bottom-up-designed participatory institu-
tions delivered greater support to the state electoral authoritarian regime 
than pro-PRI leaders in municipalities with top-down-designed institu-
tional arrangements, but only in the initial years after the UyC reforms. 
Pro-PRI leaders with bottom-up-designed participatory institutions in-
creasingly varied in their allegiance to the state electoral authoritarian 
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regime, but they retained political control over their localities and went 
on to deliver high winning margins to the parties they favored in subse-
quent years. Municipal leaders in opposition localities with bottom-up-
designed participatory institutions did much the same, although they 
showed no initial or lasting preference against the regime and vacillated 
between opposition parties and the regime earlier.  
In showing that participatory institutions can be used by pro-regime 
and anti-regime leaders to engineer political control for the political 
groups they favor, this study supports recent empirical findings about 
the way that these institutions work in the hands of incumbent leaders 
that are concerned with remaining in power. In Bolivia, Evo Morales 
implemented participatory institutional reforms after his election in the 
mid-2000s and placed them at the center of the 2009 Constitution. In 
Venezuela, Hugo Chávez campaigned on and then formalized a series of 
participatory institutions in his 1999 Constitution. Despite these leaders’ 
claims that participatory measures were designed to raise political inclu-
sion, scholars have found evidence that they favored the participation of 
incumbent supporters and the exclusion of opponents, allowing local 
level authoritarian practices on behalf of national leaders (Hawkins 2010; 
Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011; Smilde and Hellinger 
2011; Tockman and Cameron 2014; Van Cott 2008).  
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Cómo la “gobernanza participativa” fortalece los regímenes autori-
tarios: Evidencia del régimen electoral autoritario de Oaxaca, Mé-
xico 
Resumen: Las investigaciones sobre el impacto de las instituciones par-
ticipativas en América Latina aún no han estudiado cómo funcionan 
dichas instituciones en entornos autoritarios. Los autócratas nacionales 
en México llevaron a cabo reformas participativas cuando estaba vigente 
el régimen electoral autoritario de dicho país. Con base en investigación 
existente sobre descentralización política en regímenes autoritarios, ar-
gumento que las instituciones participativas pueden ser utilizadas para 
canalizar las demandas de los ciudadanos incorporando a la ciudadanía 
dentro de los sistemas autoritarios y reforzando de esta manera dicho 
gobierno. Sin embargo, siguiendo investigaciones sobre gobernabilidad 
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democrática participativa también considero que las instituciones de 
participación política funcionan mejor cuando se diseñan de “abajo hacia 
arriba” y no de “arriba hacia abajo.” El análisis estadístico de los patro-
nes de apoyo electoral autoritario a nivel municipal en México muestra 
que las instituciones participativas construidas de “abajo hacia arriba” e 
implementadas durante el régimen electoral autoritario reforzaron el 
control político local en mayor medida que los sistemas políticos diseña-
do de “arriba hacia abajo.” Este estudio apoya las investigaciones que 
revelan los efectos antidemocráticos de participación de las instituciones 
participativas en los países democráticos latinoamericanos. 
Palabras clave: México, Oaxaca, gobernanza participativa, gobierno 
municipal, regímenes electorales autoritarios  
